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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to analyze if the effectiveness of the inspection procedures in the organic 
certification is conditioned by measurable structural and managerial factors under control of organic control bodies 
(CBs), and if there is scope for possible improvements. The analysis is based on data from the archives of the largest 
Italian organic CB, containing information on operators’ characteristics, including a qualitative discrete risk score 
defined by the CB, inspectors’ characteristics, type of inspection and the outcome of the inspection, in terms of 
noncompliance detected and sanctions imposed. The aim is to analyze factors that could make an inspection more 
effective. Our measure of effectiveness is the number of detected noncompliance per inspection visit. No specific 
literature on this issue is available, therefore on the basis of available information we develop a set of hypothesis 
concerning measurable factors that might have an effect on the effectiveness of the inspections. Discrete choice models 
are used to estimate the likelihood of noncompliance conditional to a set of covariates concerning risk assessment of 
the operators, inspectors characteristics, and modalities of the inspections. Different models and their distributional 
assumptions are discussed and tested. Results show that there is scope for an increase of effectiveness of inspections, 
and the particular relevance of two factors: samples taken during the inspection and timing of the visit are confirmed as 
significant factors increasing the likelihood of both slight and severe noncompliance. 
Keywords: Organic certification, non-compliance, inspection visits, discrete choice models.  
1 Introduction 
Certification in organic farming is required to qualify a product as organic and to ensure that organic 
products are produced in accordance with organic regulations. Council Regulation No 834/2007 (EC, 2007) 
regulates the production and marketing of organic food products in the European Union. The Community 
legal framework defines the basic principles and rules of production and control (i.e., inspection) and 
certification system that are used to enforce these rules.  
Organic certification is based on controls for noncompliance with Council Regulation No 834/2007, and 
can be considered to exploit the general concept of food safety (Hanson and Caswell, 1999, Garcia and 
Martinez, 2007). Controls for assuring the compliance with organic standards should be carried out on the 
basis of a risk based approach. For an analysis on risk based controls on the food safety systems see among 
others van Asselt et al. (2012), Hutter and Amodu (2008); Hirschawer and Zwoll (2008). The issue of risk 
based controls in the organic sector is receiving recently a growing interest: see for instance Zorn et al. 
(2012, 2013) for an application of the concept of risk based controls to the German organic farming; 
Gambelli et al. (2012, 2012a, 2012b) for an application on the same the concepts on the Italian organic 
farming, and Zanoli et al. (2012), for an analysis of noncompliance in the Turkish organic farming system. 
Padel (2010) provide an analysis of the organic regulation, discussing the potential for a proper 
implementation of a risk based approach, and Dabbert (2011) provide an analysis of potential areas of 
improvements for the organic certification rules, also discussing the potential benefits from a 
implementation of risk based inspections.   
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the analysis of the effectiveness of organic certification systems, 
though with a change of perspective. Most of the studies cited above consider how to improve the 
inspection system looking for the main risk factors of noncompliance at the farm level. The aim of this 
paper is to consider the potentials for improvements of the effectiveness of organic inspections, analysing a 
set of empirical data concerning the outcomes of inspection visits performed by the main Italian Control 
Body (CB). In particular we analyze if the effectiveness of inspections, is affected by specific 
characteristics of the inspectors and of the inspections (i.e. sampling and timing of the inspection). Data are 
obtained from the archives of the CB concerning the outcomes of the inspections in terms of sanctions and 
noncompliance, with the information on the type and modalities of the inspection and on the inspectors’ 
characteristics. The analysis is based on discrete choice models, and the study is part of the EU research 
project CERTCOST. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide a short overview of the functioning 
of the organic inspection and certification system in the European Union, focusing on aspects concerning 
the implementation of the certification system in Italy; in section 3, we describe the data used in the 
empirical analysis and discuss our approach to analyzing factors that we expect might affect the 
effectiveness of the inspections; in section 4 we present and discuss the results of the analysis; in section 5 
we provide the conclusions of the paper. 
2 The legal framework of the organic certification in Italy 
The legal framework (EC, 2007) is implemented by the European Commission through Council Regulation 
No 889/2008 (EC, 2008), which defines the details of the organic production standards and controls (EC, 
2007, Art. 38) to keep the legal requirements up to date with market, societal and technological 
developments. The Food and Veterinary Office of Europe is responsible for monitoring the compliance of 
Member States with the European organic regulations. An overview of the implementation of the 
inspection and certification systems in Germany and Italy in specific is given in Figure 1.  
The member states are each required to designate a competent authority to oversee and manage the correct 
implementation of the European organic regulations. The legal framework is implemented with country 
specific modalities, and here we describe the Italian situation. Italy has designated the Ministry of 
Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies (MIPAAF) as the competent authority. Inspections and 
certification are delegated by the competent authorities to private CBs according to EC (2007), which must 
be approved by the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies (MIPAAF), and accredited by the 
accreditation body (Accredia). To obtain such approval, control bodies must meet three criteria: 
impartiality, transparency and competence. According to EC (2007), Art. 27(8), competent authorities must 
organize audits and inspections of control bodies in their territory. The aim of this supervision system is to 
verify that the control bodies properly perform the inspections and that the basic criteria for their approval 
are still fulfilled. The supervision activities include the review of relevant documentation and the inspection 
of organic operators. The regional competent authorities annually report information on the supervision 
system directly to the national (competent) authority, which reports the results to European Commission. 
The Italian competent authority delegates the supervision of the private control bodies to regional 
competent authorities (18 regions and 2 autonomous provinces) and the Central Inspectorate for the Control 
of Food Quality and Fraud Repression (ICQRF). The ICQRF supervises the activities of the control body 
independently from the regional competent authorities. Therefore, the Italian control bodies are subject to 
two distinct supervision procedures that do not necessarily employ the same criteria. In 2012, 15 control 
bodies were registered in Italy (SINAB, 2012).  
Organic operators are free to choose the CB that inspects them. Control and certification have to be paid for 
by the operator. Producers receive financial support from rural development plans for organic certification, 
but in many regions, such support is available only for farmers involved in supply chain programs. 
According to EC (2007) Art. 27(3), each organic operator must be inspected at least once a year. Additional 
controls are required based on a risk analysis, but the European regulation does not provide any detailed 
rules regarding the frequency and nature of unannounced and follow-up inspections. CBs use some type of 
internal risk-based inspection system protocol to determine what additional inspections will occur. 
Accredia provides the accredited CBs with guidelines for rating individual operators based on a qualitative 
risk evaluation. Accredia also provides a classification for non-compliance and guidelines for the associated 
sanctions (Sincert, 2009).  
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Figure 1. Overview of the main institutions and actors involved in the Italian organic certification process 
 
3 Data and model 
3.1 The data  
The data are obtained from the archives of the largest CB in Italy. The dataset considers 37,930 inspections 
on 10,249 farms from 2007 to 2009. The distribution of inspected farms per year is sufficiently 
homogeneous, as 6,599  farms (64% of the sample) were included over all of the three years, and 1,859 
farms (18%) were included for two consecutive years. Although our dataset cannot be considered as fully 
representative of the organic farming sector in Italy, it represents about 20% of the total Italian organic 
farms. The inspected farms are evenly distributed over the country, with 37% of the farms located in the 
southern regions of Italy, 32% in the central regions, and the remaining 31% in the northern regions. The 
average number of inspections per farm was 1.49 per year, and these are divided according to annual 
inspections (1.35 per year), follow-up inspections (0.05 per year), and unannounced inspections (0.09 per 
year). The inspections labelled as annual are on average more than 1 per farm/year (which is the mandatory 
requirement in the EU Regulation), as the farms might have been visited one time for each operation (i.e. 
crop production, animal production and processing). In each of the three years considered, the number of 
inspection generating slight sanctions was higher than the number of inspections generating severe 
sanctions. The share of inspections leading to slight sanctions decreases over the three years considered: 
from 7.88% in 2007 to 4.86% in 2009. Instead, the share of inspections leading at least to one severe 
sanction increases from 1.03% in 2007 to 1.82% in 2009 (see Table 3).  
The aim of the analysis is to consider which factors under the control of the CB might have an effect on the 
likelihood of detecting a noncompliance. We therefore use two types of data: data on detected 
noncompliance, and data on the characteristics of the inspections and on the inspectors.  
Concerning data on noncompliance, as for the 2007-2009 period no detailed information on noncompliance 
was available, we have used the number of sanctions imposed on an operator after the inspections as a 
proxy for non-compliance. In other words, we assumed that noncompliance was followed by sanctions, at 
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the appropriate level of severity. Regulation (EC) 834/07 classifies noncompliance as irregularities or 
infringements, and it is made clear that the former are less severe than the latter, although no explicit 
definitions are provided.  
Noncompliance, once detected, is followed by the appropriate sanction, which is issued by the control body 
itself for all types of sanctions. The Accredia guidelines (Sincert 2008) define five types of sanctions that 
are ranked according to their severity, ranging from warnings to exclusion from the organic sector.  The 
guidelines provide a clear correlation between type of noncompliance and sanctions, which means that a 
severe sanction is issued when a severe noncompliance is detected (i.e. an infringement), and a less severe 
sanction is issued in response to a correspondingly less severe non-compliance (i.e. an irregularity). In our 
analysis, we have followed the main distinction between irregularities and infringements, and have 
correspondingly classified sanctions into two categories (see Table 2): slight and severe. Slight 
noncompliance is associated with the sanctions of ‘warning’ (i.e. usually a simple letter with specific issues 
that need to be resolved before the next inspection, with no impact on certification) and ‘intimation’ (i.e. a 
more formal and ultimatum invitation to comply to resolve the detected issues, with no immediate impact 
on certification). Severe noncompliance includes the sanctions of ‘suppression’ (i.e. exclusion of the 
specific product or lot from organic certification), ‘suspension’ (i.e. temporary exclusion of the whole farm 
production from certification) and ‘exclusion’ (i.e. permanent exclusion of the farm and its productions 
from organic certification). Slight sanctions correspond to irregularities that mainly arise from the 
‘documental area’ of the controls, e.g. missing or incomplete registrations, errors in the farm document 
archiving, lack of response to the control body requests, and/or missing mandatory documentation. In many 
cases, this level of non-compliance can even be accidental, or non-intentional, in nature. Severe sanctions, 
corresponding to infringements, refer to cases such as incorrect product identification and labeling, use of 
non-permitted substances, and/or cultivation of ‘parallel’ organic and conventional crops (e.g. organic and 
conventional wheat grown on the same farm in the same year). Furthermore, severe sanctions can be issued 
when the problems indicated in a slight sanction have not been correctly tackled and resolved by the 
farmer.  
 
Table 2. Classification of sanctions  
Type of 
noncompliance 
Sanction 
classification 
Type of 
sanction 
imposed  
Description of sanctions’ effects 
Irregularity Slight sanctions 
Warning Does not invalidate organic certification.  
Intimation 
Does not invalidate organic certification but 
non compliance must be solved within a 
specific time period established by the Control 
Body 
Infringement Severe sanctions 
Suppression 
Implies the prohibition to sell as organic the 
product for which the non-compliance has 
been detected.  
Suspension 
Implies the prohibition to sell all farm’s 
products as organic. It is addressed to non-
compliances considered as essential but with 
reversible effects. 
Exclusion1 
Implies certification withdrawal. It is 
addressed to the operator as a result of non-
compliance detected as essential and with 
irreversible effects. 
 
The frequencies of various sanction types in absolute values are shown in Table 3. The share of slight 
sanctions decreases significantly over the three years considered: from 11.78% in 2007, to 7.05% in 2009. 
                                                          
1 Exclusion can also be considered when an operator is not compliant with the contractual obligations with the CB.  
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On the other hand, for the same period, the share of severe sanctions shows a slight increase, from 1.55% in 
2007, to 2.62% in 2009. In all three of the years studied, the number of slight sanctions was a lot higher 
than the number of severe sanctions, as infringements generally occur less frequently than irregularities. 
Over the three years covered by the analysis, there was a considerably high proportion of cases with zero 
sanctions, ranging between 91.57% and 98.88%, for slight and severe sanctions, respectively.  
Table 3 Frequencies of sanctions by type and year 
 2007 2008 2009 
Total farms inspected 8,763 8,629 8,208 
Total inspections.  
 
 
12,955 13,238 11,697 
Average inspection per farm (nr) 1.48 1.53 1.42 
Total slight sanctions 1,021 704 568 
 % of inspection leading  
to slight sanctions 
7.88 5.32 4.86 
Total severe sanctions 133 239 213 
 % of inspection leading  
to severe sanctions 
1.03 1.81 1.82 
 
3.2 The model 
Our aim is to explain the effectiveness of the inspection in terms of number of detected noncompliance 
using a set of factors related to inspections and inspectors characteristics. The list of the potential factors we 
have taken into consideration is shown in Table 4. When referring to dichotomous variables, the mean 
indicates the percentage of farms where that variable is present2. The potential factors influencing the 
inspection effectiveness are of two types: inspectors’ characteristics, information about the modalities of 
the inspections. Inspectors’ characteristics refer to the experience of the inspector and qualification for 
inspecting for other certification schemes (such as ISO 9001, NOP, JAS, DEMETER). The variable 
“inspector’s experience” measures the number of years she performs inspections on behalf of the CB3. The 
hypothesis here is that the ‘inspector’s experience’ could affect the effectiveness of the inspection in term 
of noncompliance detected. The variable “other certification scheme” measures could be a proxy of the 
skills and qualification of the inspector. We expect that more skilled inspectors might be more effective in 
terms of detected noncompliance.  
Information about the modalities of the inspections refers to type of inspections, samples taken during the 
inspection, inspection timing and specific farm’s risk class. All organic operators receive at least one 
inspection each per year, while additional inspections are done on a subsample of operators on the basis of 
inspection schemes decided independently by each control body, with no common approach for control 
frequency and share of unannounced. The mandatory inspections type refers to the ordinary annual 
inspection as defined by the EC (2007), Art. 27(3), and includes the examination of all relevant documents 
and process managed by the operators. Follow-up inspections are additional inspections aimed at better 
control of the operators, following the detection of noncompliance during the previous inspection. 
Announced inspections have the same characteristics of the mandatory inspections, but they are carried out 
without notice to the operators. Their frequencies can be based on  determined on the basis of the risk of 
occurrence of noncompliance. Dummies for follow-up and unannounced inspections are included to 
discriminate the potential effects in terms of effectiveness of noncompliance detection that might be due to 
the two types of inspections. Dummy for annual inspection is not used to avoid collinearity. Inspection 
could also be accompanied by sample collection of specific products. Samples of products can be tested for 
the presence of pesticides residues and other non-admitted external input. For what concern severe sanction 
model, we use dummy variable to measure when a sample is taken as we expect that sampling might affect 
the likelihood to detect severe noncompliance.  
                                                          
2 SD for a dummy variable with mean p, s.d. is: (p (1-p))1/2 i.e. s.d. for dummy variables is the higher the closer p is to 0.5. 
3 The variable ignores if the inspector was working as inspectors with other control bodies in the past, so it potentially underestimate 
the actual experience of the inspector. 
6 
We also want to take into account the timing the inspections are made, as we expect that the likelihood of 
noncompliance detection could be conditioned by the time the inspection is made, at least for certain types 
of farm. In order to establish whether or not the inspection are made at the appropriate time, we take into 
account the phenological stages of both crops and livestock productions of the farm at the time of the 
inspection. For each crops/livestock we defined  “critical periods”, i.e. time intervals when the crops and 
livestock species are more likely to need specific treatments (e.g. for pest and diseases). For each farm we 
can therefore define time periods when, according to the farm crop and livestock productions, we expect 
that the risk of noncompliance is higher. If a farm has several crops and/or livestock production, the timing 
of the visit could be: correct for all of them, or for some of them, or for none of them. To take into 
consideration these aspects, we develop a “timeliness index” as follow. For each farm i, we consider the 
number of crops and the number of livestock types that at the time of the visit t can be considered “at risk 
of noncompliance”: respectively CRit. and LVit; we also consider the total number of crops and livestock 
types for each farm: CRtoti, LVtoti. The timeliness index Tit for each inspection is then computed as 
follows:  
        𝑇𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡+ 𝐿𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑖+ 𝐿𝑉 𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑖
    (1) 
where t=time of inspection; i = i=1…n (n=total nr of farm) 
Tit ranges between Tit = 0 ( i.e. during the inspection no one of the crops/livestock types managed by the 
farm were considered at risk of noncompliance) and  Tit = 1 ( i.e. during the inspection all crops and/or 
livestock were considered at risk of noncompliance). The average value of Tit is 0,29, (see Table 4)far 
below the theoretically optimal situation where all inspection are done in the optimal timing for each farm. 
 
The effect of specific farm’s risk of non-compliance is measured by the risk index adopted the CB to rank 
the organic operator in terms of risk, on the basis of a set of risk factors provided by Accredia (SINCERT 
2008). Operators are classified as high risk, medium risk and low risk operators according to a set of 
criteria concerning the type of crops and livestock production, the occurrence of noncompliance in the past, 
the farm size, marketing aspects. Gambelli et al. (2012a; 2012b) have provided an in depth analysis of the 
risk factors at the farm level, showing that the qualitative categorization of risk factors followed by the 
Italian CBs is generally supported by empirical evidence though with some specific exceptions referring to 
specific crop productions. In our model we have used the risk index to “neutralize” the effects of farm’s 
attitude to risk, which would otherwise bias the measurement of sanctions occurrence according to the 
explanatory variables referring to inspections’ and inspectors’ characteristics. 
 
Table 4 Variables  (risk factors) included in the models  
Variable Description Mean 
Inspector’s experience  Nr of years an inspector works with the same CB 
Min: 0 Max:16  s.d.: 3.59 
7.60 
Other certification scheme  Whether or not an inspector also controls for 
other schemes than organic; = 1 yes; = 0 no 
0.56 
Annual inspection = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.91 
Follow-up inspection = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.03 
Unannounced  inspection = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.06 
Sample = 1 yes; = 0 no 0.08 
Inspection timeliness Timing  index 
Min: 0 Max:1  s.d.: 0.30 
0.28 
Risk class 1  Whether or not an operator is associated  to low 
risk class; = 1 yes; = 0 no 
0.66 
Risk class 2 Whether or not an operator is associated  to 
medium risk class; = 1 yes; = 0 no 
0.23 
Risk class 3 Whether or not an operator is associated  to high 
risk class; = 1 yes; = 0 no 
0.11 
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We have defined two models, one for the slight sanctions, and one for the severe sanctions. The two models 
differ just for the inclusion in the latter of the explanatory variable “sample”, as sampling is not applicable 
when irregularities (i.e. slight sanctions) are concerned. The outcomes in terms of slight or severe sanctions 
are the dependent variables for our models, measured over the total number of inspections in the 2007-2009 
period. A logistic regression (see Greene, 2008 among others) is used in both models, and takes the form: 
 
    (2) 
where Y is a dichotomous variable indicating the occurrence of sanctions, i=1,…,n are the n total 
inspections made in the 2007-2009 period, x’ is the vector of explanatory variables, and b the vector of 
coefficients. 
4 Results and discussion 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimations for the slight sanctions and severe sanctions cases, respectively 
model 1 and model 2. Concerning model 1, annual inspections and follow up inspection have significant 
coefficients4, though with opposite signs. Follow-up inspections show a negative coefficient, indicating that 
in the case of model 1 the irregularities (i.e. mainly bureaucratic and formal noncompliance) can be solved 
quite effectively in the time period between the inspection when the follow-up has been decided, and the 
actual follow-up inspection. On the other side, unannounced inspection have a positive coefficient, showing 
that they increase the likelihood of sanctions. Covariates concerning the inspectors’ characteristics show 
significant and positive coefficients for the “other certification schemes”, while the coefficient of the 
inspector’s experience is significant and negative. The “inspection timeliness” does not show relevant 
effects on the likelihood of slight sanctions, which is quite consistent with the type of noncompliance 
involved: bureaucratic flaws are likely to happen independently with respect to time. Finally the “risk 
class1”, i.e. the lowest risk category of farm, has a positive and significant coefficient, which again seems 
consistent with the occurrence of slight sanctions. 
Concerning model 2, we have quite a different picture. The type of inspections does not show relevant 
effects on the likelihood of severe sanctions, and the same applies for the experience of the inspectors. 
However, severe sanctions are strictly related with sampling during the inspections, and the “inspection 
timeliness” shows for model 2 a significant and positive effect. Consistently with the results of model 1, for 
model 2 the “risk class3”, i.e. the highest risk class, have a significant and positive coefficient. 
Comparing the results of the two models, we can try to formulate some considerations. Firstly, it emerges 
that the relevant factors that might improve the detection of noncompliance are different for slight and 
severe sanctions (i.e. irregularities and infringements). Secondly, for what concerns the characteristics of 
the inspectors, the experience has controversial effects: it does not show a concrete effect in the 
effectiveness of the inspection when severe sanctions are concerned, while it shows a rather unexpected 
negative effect for the likelihood of slight sanctions. We have no clear explanation for this result. Looking 
in depth at the data distribution we have observed that the share of slight sanction is particularly low for 
inspections made by inspectors with experience >12 years. We have however no hints to provide an 
interpretation for this result. On the other hand results for “other certification schemes” are more consistent 
with our expectations, showing positive and significant effect in both models. Thirdly, model 1 and model 
2 seem to behave consistently for what concerns the risk classes: the likelihood of slight sanctions is higher 
for low risk farms, and the likelihood of severe sanctions is higher for high risk farms. Also, the timeliness 
of inspections and the sampling are relevant factors for the severe sanction model only, which is consistent 
with our expectations: infringements are more likely to be detected when the inspection is made in the 
“critical” time periods of the livestock or crop productions. The significance of sampling (which was tested 
for model 2 only) could have different interpretations. On one hand, it could indicate that accurate 
inspections could be more effective in terms of noncompliance detection. On the other hand, this result 
could be “self–confirmatory” in the sense that inspectors make (costly) sampling when they have concrete 
suspects of infringements. 
  
                                                          
4 Based on a significance level of 5% (P<0.05) 
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Table 5 Result coefficients for the slight and severe sanction  models 
Variables 
Slight sanction model  Severe sanction model  
Coef. P>|z| Coef. P>|z| 
Inspector’s experience  -.03438 0.000 -.01288 0.284 
Other certification scheme  .25384 0.000 .18883 0.030 
Follow-up inspection -.29011 0.048 -.38641 0.146 
Unannounced  inspection .43889 0.000 -.16360 0.348 
Sample 
  
1.06657 0.000 
Inspection timeliness -.02074 0.783 .56999 0.000 
Risk class 1  .23224 0.000 .01693 0.868 
Risk class 3 -.09636 0.276 .32476 0.020 
Constant  -2.84903 0.000 -4.50869 0.000 
Nr Observations 37,930 37,930 
Log likelihood -8,332.260 -2,963.566 
Lr Test (P >chi2) 0.000 0.000 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze if the effectiveness of the inspections in the organic certification system could be 
improved. Our models are based on available data archived by the CB. The results are quite interesting and 
show that there is scope for improving the effectiveness of inspections following two main approaches, 
distinguished according to the type of noncompliance: irregularities (leading to slight sanctions) and 
infringements (leading to severe sanctions). In the first case, unannounced inspections and “skilled” 
inspector could increase the likelihood of detecting irregularities; in the second case the timing of the visit 
and the sampling procedures become relevant factors that could increase the likelihood of detecting 
infringements, together with the qualified skills of the inspectors. Our analysis shows that inspectors could 
exploit crops and livestock specific information at the farm level such as those related to the phenological 
stages. Actually the low value of the “timeliness index” indicates that only a limited share of inspections is 
carried out with the appropriate timing, showing therefore substantial scope for substantial improvement fo 
the effectiveness of inspections.. 
These results are of course strictly conditioned by the available data. The details concerning the inspectors 
are not particularly detailed, and more information could improve the quality of the results. Similarly, more 
details concerning the motivations and/or the procedures for sampling could help to reach a clearer 
interpretation of their effects on the effectiveness of inspections.  
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